Substantial prior literature has established that subjects in laboratory experiments are typically willing to sacri…ce their own well-being to make …nancial allocations more equal among participants. We test the applicability of this result in an environment that contains some of the key contextual issues that are usually excluded from more abstract games but which might be important in situations involving income redistribution. Our general …nding is that votes for a redistributive tax are almost entirely in accordance with self-interest: above-average earners vote for low tax rates and below-average earners vote for high tax rates. A measure of subjects' preferences for fairness or equality, their self-reported economic ideology, is not directly related to their voting behavior in this experiment. Because the ideology measure should be correlated with any intrinsic preferences regarding inequality aversion, we conclude that any preferences for fairness or inequality that our subjects possess are not strong enough to overcome self-interest in this context. We do, however, …nd evidence for a possible indirect e¤ect of ideology on choice behavior in that more conservative subjects tend to be more responsive to their self-interest than the more liberal subjects.
Introduction
Why do people support income redistribution? While classical economic theory supposes that individuals possess purely self-interested preferences, countless demonstrations both in the lab and in the …eld suggest that individual preferences are driven by some other-regarding impulses. This phenomenon has been shown to be quite robust in the bargaining literature with dictator and ultimatum games (see Camerer (2003) for an in-depth survey) as well as other contexts such as public goods (see Ledyard (1995) ) and contracting (Fehr and Falk (2002) and Fehr and Gächter (2002) ). The preferences demonstrated in laboratory experiments for small stakes have also been shown to translate into larger stakes environments and environments outside of the laboratory. 1 For example, as shown in Kam, Cranmer, and Fowler (2007) , actions in experimental dictator games have been linked to generosity in contributions to charitable groups.
While many of these demonstrations involve small-scale, interpersonal and occasionally abstract situations, government income redistribution programs are a large-scale and important observable phenomenon that might well be related to these other-regarding preferences. If people in general possess preferences for a fair distribution of income, such preferences should lead to the income redistribution programs that we observe at virtually all levels of government. Thus one might take the existence of these programs as evidence for the macro-level impact of other-regarding preferences. This claim is not entirely clear because redistributive programs may be produced by classical, self-interested preferences if politicians advocate them to gain electoral support from lowincome voters who stand to bene…t …nancially from their adoption. This explanation allows for the existence of income redistribution programs in a self-interested world that requires no otherregarding preferences. Thus it is unclear whether redistribution is driven by self-regarding or otherregarding preferences, and it is important to distinguish between those in ‡uences to understand the base of support for welfare and other similar programs.
Previous evidence indicates that a widely held preference for fair distribution explains apparently irrational public support for redistribution. For example there is reason to believe that at least some support for these programs comes from individuals with high incomes who will not …nancially bene…t from income redistribution, behavior that observers describe as a re ‡ection of a public regardingness in their behavior (see for example Wilson and Ban…eld (1964) ). This therefore supports the claim that income redistribution programs are based on other-regarding preferences of the rich rather than or perhaps in addition to the self-interest of the poor.
Some experimental evidence also shows that subjects favor more equitable income distributions, implying a not purely self-interested motive to support redistribution schemes. Scott, Matland, Michelbach, and Bornstein (2001) and Michelbach, Scott, Matland, and Bornstein (2003) report experiments in which subjects are asked to choose between various hypothetical income distributions for a hypothetical country given multiple options. They …nd that people generally choose more equitable distributions. Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavey (1987) investigate what sort of redistribution principles subjects will adopt when they are introduced to various possibilities, …nding that subjects prefer to set a minimum income ‡oor below which people cannot fall. While these studies suggest that people make political choices according to principles of fairness, the evidence provided is gathered in a setting that is (by design and intentionally) not directly analogous to how taxing and redistribution decisions are made. The Scott, Matland, Michelbach, and Bornstein (2001) and Michelbach, Scott, Matland, and Bornstein (2003) experiments involved hypothetical choices about potential income distributions, and so making more equitable choices cost the subjects nothing. The Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavey (1987) study required participants to select from among a list of speci…ed redistributive principles about which they were extensively educated, and also required extensive small-group discussion with an emphasis on unanimity when the group selected a redistribution plan. Furthermore, subjects'choices regarding redistribution policies are made behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" that rarely exists when actual political decisions are made.
Thus the extant literature that addresses preferences for redistribution su¤ers in part because people are not observed actually agreeing for their own income to be redistributed. Studies that show wealthier people support redistribution typically rely on survey research that simply asks opinions and does not observe behavior. Other studies are based on district-level voting data which are then associated with patterns of public expenditure to draw conclusions about preferences, but these are hampered by ecological inference problems. The experimental research typically involves redistribution of hypothetical wealth; that is, it does not extract actual earnings from citizens as would occur with redistribution outside of the lab.
Our goal in this study is to obtain more direct evidence on the degree to which people will support income redistribution policies in an environment similar to the one that people face in the outside world. If there is support for these policies, we also wish to determine the main causes of that support. Toward that end, we have designed a laboratory experiment intended to simulate a live voting and redistribution environment more closely than past experiments. In particular, our subjects earn income through a real e¤ort task and vote on redistributive taxes that will have a direct impact on their earnings and those of other subjects in the experiment. To determine whether the subjects'stated preference for equality corresponds to their choices in the experiment, we survey the subjects to identify their demographic and ideological characteristics. In light of prior evidence from Ho¤man, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994) showing that the generosity of subjects in bargaining games is very sensitive to whether or not they earned the superior bargaining position, our experiments are also designed to vary the degree of entitlement subjects might feel toward their earnings to determine if this has an impact on preferences for redistribution.
We …nd that many subjects vote in favor of high tax rates for income redistribution, but most of those votes can be explained by the relative earnings position of the voters. Those subjects earning above-average incomes in the experimental e¤ort task vote for low taxes, and those subjects earning below-average incomes from the task vote in favor of high tax rates. By contrast, stated ideological preferences for income redistribution have no direct impact on vote choice. There are, however, some important and interesting indirect e¤ects: conservatives'votes tend to be more closely tied to their self-interest compared to their liberal counterparts. These …ndings suggest support of redistribution policies, at least in this environment, may not be best explained by preferences for fairness or income equality. The relationship between the present …ndings and the prior literature on social preferences is discussed in detail in the concluding section.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents two theoretical models that might explain the data as well as an explanation for how we can empirically di¤erentiate between them. Section 3 presents our experiment design. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 returns to the issue of preferences for fairness and equality, particularly focusing on future work to investigate alternative origins of support for income redistribution.
Theory
In the base environment considered here, individuals engage in e¤ort for a piece rate wage to earn an income and during some rounds there will be a redistributive tax implemented that will allow for the possibility of reducing income inequality. The tax will be voted on using a median vote mechanism designed to ensure subjects have the incentive to truthfully reveal their most preferred tax rate. 2 We will provide two models capable of generating votes which might be consistent with the data and then provide an explanation for how they might be empirically discriminated from each other.
Utility Maximization with Inequality Aversion
Let e i be the chosen production level of individual i which will be multiplied by a wage rate, w i ; to give us total earnings. It will be notationally convenient in some cases to refer to earnings as y i = w i e i : E¤ort will be costly to exert and will be represented by a cost function, c(e i ; i ): We will use standard assumptions regarding the marginal cost of e¤ort, i.e. c e > 0 and c ee > 0: The parameter i is a skill parameter such that the greater is the individual's skill the lower is their marginal cost of e¤ort or c e < 0, which creates heterogeneity in the link between earnings and work e¤ort if individuals di¤er with respect to i . We will assume that i is an i.i.d. random variable distributed according to some cdf K( ) with pdf of k( ) and those distributions will be assumed to be common knowledge.
The base utility of an individual in rounds without taxation is:
Utility is trivially maximized with respect to e i at the e i such that w i = c e . Due to the assumptions on the cost function, particularly that c e < 0 or that the marginal cost of e¤ort is decreasing in i , it should be clear that higher values of i will lead to higher values of e i due to the lower marginal cost of e¤ort. When redistribution is active, individual earnings will be taxed at the rate and the taxes raised will be redistributed evenly among all members of this society. An additional complication is that, when the choice of e¤ort is made and when preferences over tax rates are elicited, individual i will be assumed not to know the values of j for j 6 = i. Consequently, i will not know the actual e¤ort level/earnings of others. However, given his knowledge of the distribution of skill levels in the population, he will be able to calculate the expected e¤ort/earnings level of others. To keep the notation simple, we will use b y to refer to the expected average productivity of others. Note that this must not only take into account heterogeneity of e¤orts (due to skill heterogeneity) but also the fact that wages can be heterogeneous. We will assume wage rates are common knowledge so they are easily taken into account.
The …nal element needed in the utility function is an element to capture the possibility that individuals might have some innate preference for fairness-speci…cally, that they might be averse to income inequality as proposed in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) . We will let b h(g( ; e; w); jK( )) measure the expected utility loss due to post redistribution inequality, where e = (e 1 ; :::; e N ) is the vector of e¤ort levels which are unknown by individual i (except for e i ) and w = (w 1 ; :::; w N ) is the vector of wage levels all of which are assumed to be known. The level of inequality will be measured by g( ; e; w), a function yielding the variance of the wealth distribution after redistribution has occurred: As prior literature demonstrates, an individual's judgment about welfare loss due to inequality is related to the origin of the inequality as well as the inequality itself. We will capture preferences over the origin of the inequality with a parameter , which we use to capture the degree to which variance in the income distribution is determined by random and uncontrollable factors rather than just the e¤ort of the individuals. 3 Because individual i must for a lower tax rate can only move the median vote even further from a person's sincere preference. A similar logic holds when the current proposal is higher than one's sincere preference.
3 It is certainly reasonable to expect that individuals might have di¤erent preferences in this regard and so we could index by individuals to allow for individual heterogeneity. Since we will not exploit any individual heterogeneity in our empirical testing of this model we will not build it into our model. We note that this is certainly not due forecast the e¤ort level of others when we elicit preferences over tax rates, the precise level of utility loss due to inequality will be unknown. Consequently, this function b h( ) is de…ned as the utility loss due to the expected level of inequality which involves integrating over all of the possible states of the world using the distribution of skill levels in the population, K( ); to get the expected level of inequality.
We will assume that the properties of b h( ) are given by the following:
None of these assumptions should be controversial, as they simply de…ne b h( ) as representing inequality aversion. To interpret the meaning of each condition, we note that the conditions on the two partial derivatives of the function imply that the expected utility loss is increasing in both the degree of inequality and the degree to which that inequality is due to external factors. The condition on the second partial with respect to g says that overall expected utility will be concave with respect to g( ). The …nal condition on the cross-partial derivative says that increasing the degree to which the inequality is due to external factors should cause the marginal utility loss of inequality to get larger. We will also need to assume that g < 0 and g > 0 or the variance in the post redistribution income distribution will be decreasing in the level of redistribution but at a decreasing rate. 4 If we combine our previous assumptions of b h g > 0 and b h gg > 0; with the assumptions on g( ); we will …nd that b h = b h g g < 0 and b h = b h gg (g ) 2 + b h g g > 0 which together mean that the expected utility loss from inequality is decreasing in the tax level at a decreasing rate. Given these additions to the basic utility function, the expected utility function for individual i becomes
Note that the parameters i and i mimic the similar parameters in the model due to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and allow for a di¤erential response to inequality based on it being disadvantageous or advantageous, respectively, from the perspective of individual i: We make the standard assumptions which are that i i and 0 i 1. The conditions on the functions above provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a unique optimal choice of e i for a given i : The …rst order condition for optimality with respect to e i now to a claim that individuals would all have identical preferences in this regard. Rather it is due to the fact that the alternative speci…cation can not be empirically exploited in our data. 4 These assumptions are not guaranteed by our assumptions on c( ) though they are certainly reasonable speci…ca-tions. The issue is that while an increase in the tax rate does lead to an increase in redistribution and therefore a drop in inequality, there are also incentive e¤ects that can lead to decreased e¤ort which might counteract the straight redistribution e¤ect. It is possible for certain speci…cations of the cost function and tax rate that an increase to the tax rate discourages low wage/low skill workers by more than high wage/high skill workers and thereby increases pre-redistribution inequality. If the level of redistribution is not su¢ cient to o¤set this e¤ect then overall inequality can rise. We acknowledge this as a possiblity but will ignore this case from the thrust of our analysis. With the alternative assumption it is clear that inequality aversion would not explain positive tax rates so it is an uninteresting case to examine in this framework. becomes:
One interesting thing to note is that in addition to voting for di¤erent tax rates, individuals can also a¤ect the inequality aversion element of their utility through their work e¤ort. Since g( ) measures the variance in the earnings, for those expecting to earn below average g e i < 0 as by increasing their earnings these individuals will be decreasing expected inequality while for those expecting to earn above average g e i > 0 as their increase in e¤ort has the opposite e¤ect. So those expecting to earn below average should work harder to alleviate their concerns about inequality and those expecting to earn above average should work less. With groups of su¢ cient size (such as those in this experiment, and particularly in society at large), the impact of one individual's e¤ort choice on the overall level of inequality will be negligible so that in practice g e i will be small. 5 The more important incentive e¤ect on work e¤ort we can derive from this condition is that equation 6 allows us to clearly see that @e =@ < 0 as an increase in decreases the net wage and therefore decreases a workers willingness to exert e¤ort. Our main interest involves examining an individual's preference over tax rates which can also be examined using equation 5. Since e¤ort choices will be made after the tax rate has been determined, preferences over tax rates will be based on the assumption that e¤ort levels will be chosen optimally based on the resulting tax rate. If we ignore the e¤ects of inequality aversion for the moment, the preferences of individuals over tax rates clearly hinge on the expectation that individual has of their earnings relative to the average. To see this we take the …rst order condition of equation 5 with respect to assuming i = i = 0 and (with minor rearranging) get
The key insight we see from this …rst order condition is that an individual's preferences will change dramatically depending on whether or not he or she expects to be earning an amount above or below the average of others. In order to analyze equation 7 we can note that the last bracketed term is simply the …rst order condition with respect to e i multiplied by @e i =@ and since we are assuming e i is already chosen optimally, the part contained in brackets is equal to 0. This is simply an application of the envelope theorem. The sign of this …rst order condition is therefore determined o¤ of the …rst two terms. For above-average earners, the sign of this …rst order condition will turn out to be unambiguously negative. If y i > b y; the …rst term in brackets is clearly negative. For the second bracketed term, we have already seen that @e i =@ < 0 and since this is true for all i it is clearly true that @b y=@ < 0 so this element is also negative for all > 0: Consequently, the FOC will be negative for all making it clear that the optimal value of the tax rate for those expecting to earn above the average of others is at the lower bound, or = 0: For those expecting to earn below average, y i < b y; the …rst term contained in brackets is now positive while the sign of the other term remains negative. If the incentive e¤ects on earnings coming through the second bracketed term are small or 0, then the FOC will be positive for all and those earning below average will choose at the upper bound, = 1; while if the incentive e¤ects are larger there can be an interior optimal value of for those earning below average. The exact optimal value will depend on the trade-o¤ between the value of redistribution and the disincentive e¤ect on the behavior of others. It should be clear that the fundamental preference over tax rates is likely to di¤er substantially between those earning above and below the average because one group bene…ts from redistribution while the other pays the cost of redistribution.
We can now examine preferences over tax rates when the inequality aversion component is included. To simplify the remaining analysis, we will assume @e =@ = 0 (which implies that @y i =@ = @b y=@ = 0) or that there are no disincentive e¤ects of taxation for this and future derivations; none of the comparative statics are substantively changed by this simpli…cation, and without it the presentation of …rst order conditions is substantially complicated without adding any additional interesting insight to the analysis beyond what was just demonstrated. The …rst order condition that determines the optimal now becomes:
The …rst term in brackets has a sign dependent on whether the individual's expected earnings are above or below the expected average of others, as before. If an individual's income is less than the average then the …rst element is clearly positive while the inequality aversion component will also be positive so long as i > 0 since b h = b h g g > 0 leading to the FOC being positive for all 0. Thus for individuals with expected below average earnings, the optimal tax rate will again be at the upper bound. 6 For those with expected above average earnings, the …rst element is now negative while the second term remains positive which implies that the sign of @u i =@ j @e =@ =0 is no longer de…nite for all : If the combination of the magnitude of i and the e¤ect of on b h( ) is large enough to o¤set the decline in utility due to the drop in personal earnings then there can be a value of > 0 which achieves an interior optimum.
The important …nding from the addition of the inequality aversion component is that while there will again be a substantial di¤erence in voting behavior between those earning above and below average, now those earning above average may prefer to vote for positive tax rates which allows us to rationalize interior votes by those earning below and above average. In addition, we can …nd two useful and important comparative static predictions regarding how the most preferred tax rate varies with two of our key parameters by applying the implicit function theorem to the …rst order condition in equation 8 to …nd that:
The sign of both of these derivatives follow directly from our assumptions regarding the properties of b h( ) and g( )
The …rst comparative static result tells us that a person's preferred tax rate grows as his/her aversion to advantageous inequality grows. 7 The second tells us that a person's preferred tax rate rises as the degree to which inequality is determined by external forces rises (that is, as entitlement to earnings weakens). The result from analyzing this model is that we see that the combination of above average earners being concerned about inequality and below average earners being concerned about the 6 Of course, had we not included the restriction that @e =@ = 0; the optimal rate would be potentially less than 100% depending on the strength of the disincentive e¤ect of taxation.
7 Were we to include the e¤ect of tax rates on discouraging e¤ort and were the e¤ect strong enough to make those su¤ering from disadvantageous inequality prefer interior tax rates, then we will …nd a similar comparative static of @ =@ 0:
disincentives of high tax rates lead to both categories of individuals preferring tax rates away from the extremes which would be the prediction of a naive model incorporating neither e¤ect. Further, we can also show that the preferred tax rates of individuals should be increasing in the degree to which they are inequality averse and in the degree to which the inequality in the population is generated by luck rather than e¤ort. All of these predictions can be examined in the data to determine how capable is a model of inequality aversion of explaining the voting behavior of the subjects.
An Alternative Model: Random Utility
Of course, inequality aversion is not the only way to generate observed preferences for tax rates other than 0% and 100%. An empirically reasonable alternative is to assume that individuals possess no aversion to inequality but that there is some random component to their utility. 8 To illustrate the point, we will brie ‡y lay out a model of behavior under probabilistic choice and show that its predictions are similar to those of the model with inequality aversion. Suppose that an individual's utility at a given choice of the tax rate is given by:
where
That is, utility is a function of systematic factors-one's own e¤ort, the income of others, and the tax rate's e¤ect on one's total earnings-and a random component that is related to the current tax rate. This random component in the utility function could represent some uncertainty on the part of the individual regarding how they will view the tax rate once implemented or a truly random noise component that represents the e¤ect of pure error or transient psychological states (i.e., mood) that exert e¤ects on choice. Prior work on the theory of probabilistic choice dating back to Luce (1959) (or more recently Palfrey 1995, 1996) has demonstrated that, when " j takes a Type I extreme value distribution, the probability of individual i choosing tax rate when asked for his most preferred tax rate is given by:
Here, is a scale parameter related to the variance of ", with larger values indicating less randomness in decision making. = 0 implies that actions are completely random and unrelated to the systematic component of utility, while ! 1 implies that actions are completely non-random.
To illustrate what we expect our subjects to do if they behave probabilistically, we assume some …xed . From analysis above, we know that the sign of @u j =@ is largely determined by the gap between y i andŷ, with those above the expected earnings average favoring no taxes as the slope is negative and those below the expected average favoring high taxes as the slope is generally positive. When the systematic di¤erences in utility are small, that is when u j (e i j j ) is essentially the same for all j , then we expect many interior values of j to have positive probability. So, middle income voters (those for whom y i is very close toŷ) should be expected to vote for a wide variety of tax rates due to their relative indi¤erence among all of the alternatives. As a person's own income gets further from the expected average income, the slope of @u j =@ gets more positive (for poorer voters) or more negative (for richer voters), and the cumulative density of Pr( = j ) concentrates itself at one end of the tax spectrum. Thus, for voters whose incomes are more extreme, we should expect to see tax preferences that are correspondingly more extreme.
Distinguishing Inequality Aversion from Random Utility
Clearly an observed preference for interior tax rates for those with below and above average expected earnings can emerge from either of these models. The important implication is that the observation of interior votes even by those earning above average is not su¢ cient to provide evidence for inequality aversion. With two models capable of generating the same choice patterns, it is important to understand how we might empirically discriminate between these two models to determine which provides a more compelling explanation for the data.
Our approach will be based on the key comparative statics we derived out of the inequality aversion model. The …rst is that a person's most preferred tax rate is increasing in the degree to which he/she dislikes inequality. The second is that most preferred tax rates should also increase with the belief that inequality is due to something other than individual e¤ort. These comparative static responses should exist in the data if the interior votes are driven by inequality aversion. If, however, inequality aversion in our subjects is not strong enough to be driving voting behavior, these comparative statics will not be observed and we will instead be able to rationalize votes for interior tax rates under the assumption that subjects engage in standard logistic choice in which they vote for their more preferred tax rates with higher probability rather than certainty. In the next section, we will describe in detail what we will use as a proxy measurement for inequality aversion in generating this test.
Experiment Design
Our experiment is designed to evaluate the impact of an individual's self-interest and ideology on his/her preference for income redistribution. The subjects earn money by exerting e¤ort in a production task. This task is a twenty question multiple-choice spelling test that the subjects have 90 seconds to complete. All spelling questions were the same for every subject in a given period across sessions. This task mirrors aspects of the real-world work environment that we want to parallel: the task is di¢ cult, uninteresting, performed under deadline pressure and some people are intrinsically more skilled at it than others. 9 There are three distinct phases in each session of our experiment: production without a redistributive tax, production under an initial tax rate chosen by the subjects, and production under a new tax rate chosen by the subjects. The …rst phase (without tax) lasts for 5 periods of production, while the second and third phases (with an endogenously chosen tax rate) last for three periods of production each.
We conducted our experiment in the xs/fs Computer Laboratory at Florida State University. We recruited subjects using a web-based announcement system that allowed a pre-existing pool to volunteer for the experiment a few days in advance. The pool consisted of undergraduate students who opted to receive experiment announcements after initial recruitment in introductory social science classes. The subjects did not know the details of our experiment and had not previously participated in sessions of this experiment (some had experience with other, unrelated experiments). All participants received a $10 show-up fee plus the money they earned during the experiment, which averaged an additional $10 to $15. At the appointed time, either 9 or 11 subjects sat at individual computer terminals with carrels that prevented interaction among participants. After administering a standard consent form, we distributed instruction forms and asked the subjects not to talk with others for the remainder of the experiment. The entire experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software package for conducting experiments, Fischbacher (2007) .
In the experiment, subjects use the median voting rule to select the tax rate that will apply: each subject casts a vote for the tax rate he/she prefers (in the range of 0 to 100 percent) and the median vote becomes the tax rate. Under the median voting rule, sincere voting is a weakly dominant strategy; the subjects have no strategic incentive to hide their most-preferred tax rate. Once a rate is chosen, our experimental program collects taxes and divides the proceeds evenly among all subjects for the three production periods following the choice. Because all subjects receive an equal share, the tax scheme redistributes income from above-average earners (who pay more than an equal share of taxes) to below-average earners (who pay less). Those with incomes near the average gain or lose little from redistribution.
We systematically vary the relationship between merit and pay across sessions of our experiment to activate entitlement (or merit fairness) norms possessed by our subjects. This treatment corresponds to exogenously altering the parameter between treatments. In the Equal Pay treatment, each subject receives an equal pay rate of $0.16 per correctly spelled word and a penalty of -$0.053 per incorrectly spelled word. 10 In the Random Unequal Pay treatment, the program randomly assigns subjects in a session to either a high pay rate ($0.20 per correct word, -$0.067 per incorrect word) or a low pay rate ($0.12 per correct word, -$0.04 per incorrect word) at the beginning of the experiment, with 50% of subjects in each pay rate. Since the number of subjects is odd, we place one extra subject in the low pay rate. In an Earned Unequal Pay treatment, we place every subject at the low pay rate ($0.12 per correct word, -$0.04 per incorrect word) for the …rst two periods. The program awards the 50% of subjects with the highest number of correctly answered questions a high pay rate ($0.20 per correct word, -$0.067 per incorrect word) at the end of the second period; this new pay rate lasts for the remainder of the experiment. Again, one extra person remains in the low pay rate due to the odd number of subjects. Each session used only one pay treatment condition. At any pay rate and in any treatment, we neither reward nor penalize answers left blank.
The instructions for the …rst phase of our experiment, 11 which we distribute in written form to the subjects and read aloud, include a trial period of production that the subjects work through on their computer terminals to familiarize themselves with the software. We also show and explain to the subjects a sample payo¤ screen, which the subjects see after every 90-second period of production. The payo¤ screen displays how many questions an individual subject answered correctly and incorrectly, his/her pay and penalty associated with each, and his/her total earnings. The screen also shows the overall average net earnings for the period of other participants in that session, so that each subject determines how well he/she is doing relative to others in that session. In the Earned Unequal Pay treatment, subjects are told about the tournament aspect of the experiment at this time, before the …rst two periods begin.
After the …rst phase of production (5 periods), we deliver written and oral instructions for the second phase of the experiment, which introduces the taxation and redistribution system that will exist in the remaining portion of the experiment. We familiarize the subjects with the tax system, teach them the median voting rule under which they select their own tax rate, and show them sample voting screens. The voting screen includes the subject's own average per-period earnings 1 0 The penalty for incorrectly spelled words is designed to prevent random guessing from being a winning strategy. The expected value of a random guess is $0 in every treatment.
1 1 The instructions scripts are in an Appendix to the paper.
in the previous three periods as well as the overall per-period average of all subjects in the session. This allows subjects to compare their production performance to the average of the other subjects' production. The subjects are also shown a sample payo¤ screen that displays how much money is taken out in taxes and how much is received from redistribution at the end of each production period. We explicitly tell the subjects that the tax system is redistributive and show them an example of how income redistribution occurs under the tax plan. After three rounds of production under the tax regime they voted for, the subjects are verbally instructed that they have another opportunity to choose a tax rate under the same voting process as before. After choosing a new tax rate via the median voter rule, the subjects produce for three rounds under this tax. All voting and payo¤ display screens are the same as in the previous phase.
At the end of three more rounds of production, the experiment ends. Subjects …ll out a short questionnaire about their demographic characteristics and political beliefs. The questionnaire, which is included as an appendix to this paper, asks 14 questions drawn from the General Social Survey. Some questions are designed to measure the subjects'general views on the acceptability of inequality such as:
"Please react to the following statement: In a free society, it is all right if a few people accumulate a lot of wealth and property while many others live in poverty."
Other questions are designed to elicit identi…cation with political a¢ liation or ideology, "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" Still other questions ask about the upbringing of the subjects, such as the education level of their parents, their city of primary residence (before college), and their family's income. Our standard demographic questions included race, religion and major area of study. Once every subject completes the questionnaire, we pay each subject their individual earnings privately before releasing them from the experiment.
There are two reasons for including this ideology survey. First, as we discuss in our introduction, in survey studies questions such as these are often thought to measure the willingness of individuals to support redistribution. By comparing subjects'survey responses to their preferred tax rates we can determine if in fact these unincentivized survey results should be considered as indicators for who would be willing to support redistribution. Second, the questions serve as a measure of the degree to which the subjects are averse to inequality. When subjects are asked directly whether they …nd inequality acceptable or not and say no, we believe that it makes sense to conclude that these subjects are more inequality averse than other subjects who respond that inequality is acceptable. Having this measure of inequality aversion separate from the main experiment is important to our empirical strategy for determining if votes are being driven by inequality aversion or self-interest.
While we could have used some additional incentivized experiment module to obtain our measure of inequality aversion, in our view this survey approach had many advantages. For example, performing an additional incentivized task would have presented a very serious risk of contamination of results between the main experiment and this additional task. It seems less likely that an individual would switch their professed party a¢ liation based on the outcome of the experiment compared to the chance of acting more sel…shly in a secondary task based on perceived mistreatment in the main task or vice versa. Further, while it is possible that conducting the survey after the experiment could lead to subjects answering the survey in a way that justi…es their behavior in the experiment, this would work against our eventual …ndings-any bias tends to be toward con…rming a link between our survey measure and behavior in the experiment. Combined with the fact that assessing the correlation between the survey results in individual behavior is interesting on its own, we believe that our design choice was optimal for our particular needs.
There are of course important caveats to note about using these survey measures about attitudes regarding inequality as measuring attitudes towards inequality inside of an experiment. While these questions are commonly used for this purpose in survey studies, it is certainly possible that someone who is quite concerned about inequality at the societal level is unconcerned about any inequality that might emerge inside of the laboratory due to a variety of contextual di¤erences between the lab and the …eld. Thus individuals might respond to the survey questions indicating strong distaste for inequality yet not be observed to object to inequality in the laboratory environment. Since many prior papers have found aversion to inequality in laboratory studies with similar populations and for similar stakes, we see no reason to be convinced that the laboratory sterilizes concerns about inequality people might have outside the lab. For our purposes all we require is that expressed preferences about inequality outside the lab correlate to such preferences inside the lab and this seems a mild assumption. So while we acknowledge the potential problem in using this survey measure of preferences towards inequality, in our view the previously discussed advantages of this approach outweigh the disadvantages.
We conducted three sessions of the experiment in each treatment, for a total of nine sessions. Two of the nine sessions included eleven subjects; the rest had nine subjects 12 for a total of 85 subjects. We observed a total of 170 votes, 85 …rst votes and 85 second votes.
Results
Since each subject produced for 11 periods in a session, we observed 935 rounds of production in all. Across all treatments, subjects answered an average of 8.41 spelling questions correctly in each round, with a standard deviation of 3.66 questions. Figure 1 displays box plots of the earnings distributions in the experiments. 13 This …gure demonstrates the overall pattern in earnings and shows that there is substantial earnings variation in the pre-tax portion of the experiment (periods 1-5) with many subjects earning at or near 0. After the tax is introduced in period 6, it is clear that income inequality is decreased. Furthermore, inequality appears greatest in the Earned Unequal Pay treatment.
Methods and Variable Descriptions
Over the course of the sessions, the median tax rate chosen ranged from 35% to 50% in the …rst round of voting, and from 15% to 60% in the second round of voting. These tax rates indicate that some subjects were voting for substantial redistributive income taxes. Our …rst goal is to explain what in ‡uenced the voting behavior that underlies the tax rates the subjects chose.
As described above, a simple model incorporating only self interest would suggest that there should only be a single determinant of a subject's vote: their expectation of making earnings above or below the average in the production phase leading to binary choices of taxes at the extremes of 0 and 100%. If we correct for the disincentive on e¤ort generated by high tax rates then the extreme high tax rate would be moderated to something less than 100% but still those expecting to earn below average would vote for substantial redistribution. To analyze the choice behavior regarding tax rates our base econometric speci…cation will be a logistic choice model which takes the following form:
where X contains a vector of explanatory variables. There are important bene…ts of this speci…cation over an OLS speci…cation. First, OLS can predict votes that lie outside of the [0,100] boundaries but the actual choices are constrained. Second, we expect covariates to have a nonlinear relationship with voting behavior due to the boundaries: increasing values of the covariates can only increase (or decrease) votes so far, implying that …tted regression line must be s-shaped with y-asymptotes of 0 and 1. The list of variables, X; can be expanded to include the variables deemed relevant for the choice of tax rate which will allow us to determine if our variables related to the inequality aversion of our subjects help to explain the voting behavior.
Both of our models indicate that earnings relative to the average will be important. So, we include a measure of the di¤erence between a subject's earnings and the average earnings of all the subjects in that session in the three periods leading up to the vote, or their Distance from Average Earnings; recall that subjects themselves know this value prior to voting. We also want to use elements from the ideology and demographic survey to determine whether any of these variables can help to explain voting behavior to test the comparative static prediction above regarding how an individual's voting behavior should vary with the degree to which they dislike inequality. The survey portion allows us to construct measures regarding how much subjects dislike inequality as the questions were chosen speci…cally for this purpose. To allow for a parsimonious regression, we have constructed an overall ideology measure that incorporates all the relevant opinions and attitudes about income inequality gathered on the post-experiment questionnaire. We do this using a principal component analysis (PCA) to construct a variable (called Conservatism) for each subject that measures the economic component of their ideology, leaving out social issues. We extract a principal component from responses to questions 1 through 5 of the questionnaire to form this variable, as these questions are direct measures of ideology and/or attitude toward income redistribution. 14 This …rst principal component has a singular value twice as large as the next nearest component and loads on the observable variables as expected. The resulting index ranges from -2.19 to 3.46, with higher values indicating greater economic conservatism. While this variable is really a measure of (lack of) dislike of inequality rather than a general measure of whether a subject is "conservative" or "liberal," we will still employ those terms as shorthand ways of describing those who evidence a weaker or stronger aversion to inequality on the survey measures.
We designed our experiment with di¤erent treatments allowing for the possibility that di¤erent entitlement norms may emerge and a¤ect voting behavior as predicted by our model with inequality aversion. Hence, we must also include dummy variables corresponding to our treatment conditions of Random Unequal Pay and Earned Unequal Pay with the Equal Pay treatment serving as the baseline. Our base statistical model of voting behavior includes all the variables mentioned above and we also conduct additional regressions which include certain interaction terms between these base variables. A product term between Conservatism and Distance from Earnings Average tests whether ideology ampli…es or mitigates the impact of self-interest on preference for redistribution. Product terms between Distance from Earnings Average and the treatment variables (Random Unequal Pay Treatment and Earned Unequal Pay Treatment) test whether the fairness of the treatment changes our subjects'responsiveness to their self-interest.
Descriptive Statistics
As a …rst look at the data we have provided Table 1 which shows average votes for the …rst and second voting opportunity, Vote 1 and Vote 2, broken out by whether the individuals were above or below average earners, their score on the ideology variable and then across treatments. The obvious expectation is that in every grouping the highest tax rate should be chosen by the liberal group and then the lowest by the conservative group. This pattern is a fairly rare occurrence. Among the below average earners, the liberal group never exhibits the highest average tax rate preference and is often quite far below the other two groups. Among the above average earners the liberal group has the outright highest preference only twice while they tie for the highest two more times. Overall, there does not appear to be a strong relationship between ideology and voting behavior.
Nor do entitlement norms seem to be strongly activated by our treatment conditions, which are patterned after those of prior experiments which showed the activation of such norms. If we examine the summary statistics for the e¤ect of the treatment regarding the entitlement to earnings, we predict that the lowest tax rates should be voted for in the Earned Unequal Treatment (where entitlement to earnings was strongest) and the highest in the Random Unequal treatment (where entitlement to earnings was weakest). As before, this pattern is intermittent at best. If this pattern does exist in the data, we will need regression analysis to recognize it. Another summary look at the voting behavior is presented in Figure 2 which shows scatterplots of the votes of the subjects at both voting opportunities plotted against that individual's distance from the average earnings of their group. In both cases we see a very strong relationship between this measure of relative earnings and the voting behavior of the subjects.
Direct E¤ects of Self-Interest, Ideology, and Entitlement Norms
While the summary statistics strongly indicate what our results are going to be, we provide our regression results for statistical veri…cation. The logistic model we described above is …tted using non-linear least squares (NLS) regression with the standard errors clustered at the session level. We have conducted regressions for the entire set of subjects combined as well as with above and below average earners separated out. We have also conducted the regressions both with and without the interaction terms for easier inference regarding the base e¤ects. The results from these regressions are contained in tables 2 and 3.
The strongest and most consistently statistically signi…cant e¤ect on voting behavior is the self-interest term, or the Distance from Average Earnings. The negative coe¢ cient means that the farther are one's earnings above (below) the average in the three periods prior to the voting decision, the lower (higher) is one's vote for the tax. In the models without interaction terms, the variable Conservatism does not rise to statistical signi…cance at any level in any of the regression speci…cations. 15 Our treatment variables are likewise insigni…cant in the non-interacted models. As explained in section 2, while both of our behavioral models are capable of explaining interior votes, the inequality aversion model predicts that votes over taxes should be correlated with the degree to which an individual dislikes inequality as measured by the Conservatism variable. This prediction is not supported in any of the speci…cations.
By comparing the results in tables 2 and 3 there is an indication that subjects made more self-interested choices in the second vote than in the …rst. A logistic model of percentage vote change 16 using the independent variables from tables 2 and 3 con…rms that an increase (decrease) 1 5 Due to the problematic issues associated with such a compound Conservatism measure we repeated our analysis including all variables from the questionnaire separately in place of the ideology index. All variables from the survey were statistically insigni…cant in the model, including the questions that we did not incorporate into our index. We chose to present the more parsimonious analysis but the full results are available upon request.
1 6 In this model, the dependent variable was the proportion of possible change in vote that a subject actually made. For example, if a subject voted for 50% taxes the …rst time and 60% taxes the second, the dependent variable would have been Scatter points are observations of subjects'…rst and second votes. The solid prediction line was generated from a logistic model using only Vote 1 and a constant term as predictors. The dotted 45 degree line shows whether Vote 2 was higher or lower than Vote 1.
in preference for redistributive taxes tends to be associated with lower (higher) income, with the same signi…cant and negative interaction between conservatism and self-interest as in tables 2 and 3. Figure 3 illustrates that a subject's second vote tends to be in the same direction as his or her …rst vote, but more extreme in magnitude. That is, subjects tend to drift toward the extremes of 0% and 100% votes over time. 17 There are multiple reasonable explanations for this result: subjects may become more self-interested over time, they may become more certain of whether they will be above or below the average earnings in a period, or they may become more informed about the relationship between the tax system and their preferences as they gain experience under its rules.
voting scale have less distance to move than those with votes closer to the middle. To facilitate a logistic regression, we also linearly transformed this variable (whose domain was -1 to 1) to lie between 0 and 1. The results of this regression are omitted, but are available from the authors upon request. 1 7 In fact, the relationship between these two quantities is statistically signi…cant (p < :001), and 60% of the variance in second vote choice can be explained by a logistic model on …rst vote choice (and a constant) alone. 
Most Liberal 33% of Subjects

The Indirect E¤ect of Ideology
While the regressions reveal no (statistically signi…cant) direct relationship between ideology and preference for redistribution, there is some evidence of an indirect relationship. In most speci…ca-tions we observe a negative, statistically signi…cant interaction term between Distance from Average Earnings and Conservatism which indicates that economic conservatives are more responsive than liberals to their self-interest when they choose their vote for redistribution, though self-interest is a signi…cant e¤ect for each. Figure 4 , a plot of the predicted …rst vote against distance from earnings average for the most conservative and most liberal subjects in our sample, tells the story: while subjects across the ideological spectrum respond to their self-interest, conservatives tend to be more strongly in ‡uenced. 18 It is interesting to note that conservatives do not just vote for lower taxes than liberals when they are relatively wealthier but, as demonstrated in Table 1 , they also vote for higher taxes than liberals when they are relatively poorer which is counter to their stated ideology. Note that this correlation between ideology and voting behavior is not a result predicted by the inequality aversion model and while it shows a relationship between ideology and voting behavior, the mechanism behind it is likely not related to di¤erential levels of inequality aversion.
The Indirect E¤ect of Entitlement Norms
We designed our three treatments based upon prior results in Ho¤man, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994) and Scott, Matland, Michelbach, and Bornstein (2001) showing that the degree to which someone feels entitled to earnings or position will a¤ect his or her behavior. Our model based on inequality aversion also generates a comparative static prediction suggesting that the
Random Unequal Pay
Distance from Earnings Average ( degree to which individuals believe that any inequality is driven by exogenous forces should a¤ect voting behavior. Thus by examining how voting behavior changes across treatments we can provide another test to help us distinguish between our two models. Tables 2 and 3 showed us that manipulating the entitlement (or merit fairness) of the treatment exerted no strong direct e¤ect on the subjects'preference for income redistribution which is initial evidence that this comparative static too fails to …nd support in our data. There is, however, tenuous evidence that subjects are less responsive to their self-interest when pay is randomly assigned than they are under the equal pay treatment. In particular, a subject with a median conservatism score and earnings $0.50 below the average is predicted to support a 69.5% tax rate in the random unequal pay treatment, compared to a 79.7% tax rate in the baseline (equal pay) treatment and a 92.9% tax rate in the earned pay treatment. A person $0.50 above the average income is predicted to support a 21.2% tax rate in the random unequal pay treatment, but a 9.20% tax rate in the equal pay treatment and only a 1.84% tax rate in the earned pay treatment. The pattern is clearly shown in Figure 5 .
Interpreting these results, voting behavior in the second round of our experiment indicates that when entitlement norms are weaker-that is, when pay is less …rmly linked to e¤ort and skill-then self-interest is a far less important motivation for behavior. Conversely, when encountering earned pay rate di¤erentials, the situation with the strongest entitlement to their earnings, people are extremely responsive to their self-interest compared to subjects in the equal pay treatment. This interaction between self-interest and the treatment is not predicted by the inequality aversion model presented above, but this second order e¤ect could be considered as weak evidence for entitlement norms determining subjects'willingness to redistribute income. 19
Productivity, Pay and Tax Incentives
Beyond the issue of preferences for redistribution, we also found it interesting to see whether an increased tax rate reduced work e¤ort. To assess this we examine our data to determine whether variable tax rates a¤ect productivity. As seen in Figure 2 there were a number of votes for extreme tax rates at or near 100%. This suggests that voters were not correcting for a disincentive e¤ect in their voting behavior, but this does not address the work disincentive question directly. We do so using a linear regression model, where the dependent variable is the number of spelling questions correctly answered by an individual subject in a period. There were three di¤erent wage rates employed in the experiment. the base wage was $0.16 per correct answer and then in the unequal pay treatments the low wage was set to $0.12 and the high wage to $0.20. To assess the impact of di¤erent wage rates we include dummy variables for the latter two rates to help us assess how e¤ort varies with the wage rate. Our Tax Rate variable measures the tax rate in e¤ect during the period of production. Each model employs the Conservatism index and treatment dummies that were used and explained in the earlier voting models to capture any possible in ‡uence that ideology or pay fairness might exert on productivity. It is possible, for example, that our subjects produce less when they feel that their pay is unfair. It is important to note that we must exclude the Earned Unequal Pay treatment from our model, because this treatment creates correlation between pay rate and productivity by design.
As our productivity data are time-series cross-sectional, we must be concerned about spatial and contemporaneous correlation in the errors biasing our inferences, particularly because certain rounds of production seem to have easier or harder questions than others and because there is a strong upward trend in productivity over time (probably due to experience with the task). Our modeling approach accounts for these features of our data to prevent them from a¤ecting our estimates. First, we use an ordinary least squares model with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) that are designed to correct for spatial correlation (Beck and Katz 1995) . Second, we include a Period variable to remove the trend from the data. We also include a panel-speci…c autoregressive error speci…cation to correct for possible temporal dependence in productivity within subjects.
Our regression results are shown in Table 4 and indicate that higher pay is associated with greater productivity and lower pay is associated with lower productivity, and both associations are statistically signi…cant. It is interesting to note that a wage increase from the base of $0.16 to the high wage of $0.20 had twice the positive impact on productivity as the negative impact from the decrease down to $0.12. We also note that a higher tax rate was not associated with lower productivity. This is a puzzling result given that the practical impact of pay rate increase and tax rate decrease on incentives to produce are identical. Further, explanations for why the tax rate should not have slowed production related to the design of the experiment (e.g. subjects had nothing to do other than produce) should also have led subjects to not change their behavior due to di¤erences in wages. Despite this theoretical symmetry of e¤ect, subjects apparently interpreted the compensation changes di¤erently and did not slow their production in response to higher taxes. 20 If subjects observed this lack of a disincentive to e¤ort during the …rst phase of redistribution, it may well provide another reason for at least those earning below average making their votes more extreme for the second phase of redistribution.
Relating Table 4 : Regression of producitivity on its potential determinants.
standard theory suggests that labor supply should increase with pay rate, most elasticity estimates are quite small. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for example show that a 10 percent increase in male wage rates would increase the amount of labor supplied by 1 percent in the median (the response rate for women was higher). Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998) …nd a similarly moderate response to changes in taxes. One standing concern about interpreting such studies is that most of the population does not have much of an ability to adjust their labor supply except in large discrete blocks as wages change. This tends to diminish the ability to …nd much responsiveness. In our experiment, subjects could smoothly respond to changes in the wage rate allowing for a stronger observed response. Fehr and Goette (2007) conducted a …eld experiment in which they unexpectedly changed the wages of bike messengers who could freely choose their working hours and observed their response. Consistent with our results, they found a substantial increase in the labor supply measured as the number of shifts worked per week, while they also observed a simultaneous decrease in e¤ort per shift. They could not observe such changes in response to changes in tax rates. Consequently it is di¢ cult to determine the degree to which our results match up with existing results on labor supply. The regression results also picked up an upward trend in productivity over the course of the experiment, which amounted to an average increase of two-…fths of a question correctly answered per period elapsed. Interestingly, the regression detects a slight association between economic conservatism and productivity; the most extreme conservatives in our data set produced one-half a question more per period on average than the most extreme liberals in our set. This relationship is possibly an artifact of correlation between conservatism and family schooling in the data: in an unreported analysis, we …nd a statistically signi…cant relationship between self-reported father's schooling and the conservatism index.
Summary and Discussion
Substantial prior literature has established that subjects in laboratory experiments are typically willing to sacri…ce their own well-being to make …nancial allocations more equal among participants. We tested the applicability of this result in an environment that contained some of the key contextual issues that are usually excluded from more abstract games but which might be important in situations involving income redistribution. Our general …nding is that votes for a redistributive tax were almost entirely in accordance with self-interest: above-average earners vote for low tax rates and below-average earners vote for high tax rates. A measure of subjects'preferences for fairness or equality, their self-reported economic ideology, was unrelated to their voting behavior in this experiment. Because our ideology measure should have been correlated with any intrinsic preferences regarding inequality aversion, we conclude that any preferences for fairness or inequality that our subjects possessed were not strong enough to overcome self-interest in this context.
Because our results seem to run counter to prior experimental evidence, it is important to interpret these results carefully. While there is evidence that people will sacri…ce their own well being for others in abstract ultimatum and dictator games, there is also evidence that this willingness decreases substantially in cases where the subjects have earned their position. Our results should be taken as further con…rmation of that result. Our results strongly suggest that when money to be re-distributed is earned through real e¤ort, subjects are much less willing to sacri…ce their well-being for that of others than might be inferred from standard ultimatum and dictator game data. These results are therefore quite important in helping us to understand the degree to which we can extrapolate results from standard dictator and ultimatum game experiments into macro level contexts like this that include multiple additional elements.
The failure of the ideology variable to explain much about the data (at least using direct e¤ects) is more problematic and more interesting. There can be little doubt that there is substantial support for income redistribution outside of the lab, often by people who do not receive a …nancial bene…t from redistribution. There is, however, little evidence of such behavior in our experimental society. This suggests that there may be something missing from the environment in our laboratory polity that generates support for redistribution by wealthy individuals outside the lab. That is not to say that our results are not informative. Our results strongly suggest that when individuals are engaging in e¤ort to earn their income and when inequality is primarily determined by e¤ort/skill di¤erentials, inequality averse preferences are likely not strong enough to lead to redistribution. The fact that individuals vote against self-interest and for redistribution in other environments points strongly to the possibility that other environmental factors are important to that outcome and this study represents an important step along the path to identifying exactly which environmental factors will trigger individuals to vote counter to their self-interest.
In addressing this issue, it is important to note that there is …eld evidence of voting behavior which would appear to match the patterns we …nd in our laboratory setting. Smith (1975) presents data from a Washington state ballot initiative on school funding equalization, providing a …gure that looks almost identical to our Figure 2 . Counties that stood to lose money from the initiative had a low percentage voting in favor of equalization, while those that stood to gain had a high percentage voting for the initiative and those counties expecting little change exhibited intermediate levels of support. 21 Other …eld research on education funding (see Berkman and Plutzer (2004) ) which seeks to address the self-interest question directly using individual-level data with suitable controls for ideology and other confounding factors, shows that preferences for funding local schools are driven by self-interest as well as the extent to which citizens feel tied to the community. We also note that Verba and Schlozman (1977) …nd a link between income and preference for redistribution in …eld survey data. So while there may be some situations in which individuals vote di¤erently than we …nd in this environment, there is evidence showing others in which they vote as our subjects do here. This too points to a need to understand what elements trigger the di¤erential approaches to voting.
There are a number of candidates for elements that are missing from our current design which could trigger ideological based voting. The e¢ ciency of the government transfer program is one such element: programs thought to possess low e¢ ciency will generally enjoy lower popular support and potentially substantially lower support among more conservative voters. Our program possessed 100% e¢ ciency which might indicate why low earning conservatives found redistribution less objectionable than they might outside of the lab. Another plausible concern is that income variability among our subjects is too small to induce a desire for redistribution, introducing a bias that favors our …nding evidence for self-interest. A large pool of prior laboratory evidence (see chapter 2 in Camerer (2003)) strongly suggests otherwise: subjects seem to care about inequality when even more trivial amounts of money are concerned (i.e., on the level of one subject receiving $3 while another receives $7). The fact that subjects in prior experiments consistently act in opposition to their own self-interest suggests that the strongly self-interested behavior in our experiment is not due to a lack of variation in income among the subjects.
A similar argument can be made with regard to the overall size of the stakes. Our subjects were voting on tax plans that amounted (at most) to marginal gains or losses of …ve to ten dollars, while actual redistributive tax policies lead to redistribution on a scale many orders of magnitude larger. To make the issue clear: could our subjects have acted more egoistically in the lab than they would have in the voting booth because they knew no one would starve or go homeless as a result of their behavior? Again, data from previous experimental studies suggests not. Several studies of dictator and ultimatum games raise the stakes to hundreds of dollars with US undergraduates and even a month's wages or more in countries where researchers can a¤ord to conduct such experiments (see cites from footnote 1). Where raising the stakes has any e¤ect (and often there is none), increased stakes induce more self-interested behavior. This implies that our experiment may actually be too conservative in estimating the in ‡uence of self-interest on behavior compared to the …eld rather than overestimating it.
Another important potential factor has to do with the attribution of merit or fault to those with lower incomes. In our experiment, the only reason a subject would receive income redistribution payments is due to some combination of e¤ort and ability in the production task. 22 Recipients of income transfers outside the lab are often in their position due to circumstances beyond their control. Residents of New Orleans and Mississippi who were displaced due to Hurricane Katrina, for example, certainly did nothing to deserve their negative wealth shock except perhaps choosing to live in an area with a higher than average risk of such an event. Similarly, many recipients of welfare payments are unemployed due to cyclical downturns in the economy or the pro…tability of their prior employer. Both situations may well be beyond the control of the unemployed person. It is very likely that people who are not willing to redistribute income to people who are responsible for their own poverty would be likely to transfer income to people who had poverty thrust upon them for reasons beyond their control. This point also raises the social insurance aspect of many redistribution plans: people who are …nancially secure may support such income redistribution to insure themselves against poverty in the future if they su¤er a random negative wealth shock. Our current results are insu¢ cient for evaluating these alternative explanations for the widespread support that income redistribution enjoys. Evaluating these possibilities is left for future research. What our results do establish is that, absent these other possible triggers, people vote largely according to their self-interest and not their ideology or intrinsic preference for equitable income distributions. This is an important result for understanding the basis of the support for redistribution but is certainly not the …nal word as future research must attempt to identify the other environmental features which can trigger support for redistribution.
